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SUMMARY: In this paper I concern myself with The Superman Puzzle (the 
phenomenon of the substitution failure of co-referential proper names in 
simple sentences). I argue that the descriptive content associated with proper 
names, besides determining the proper names reference, function as truth-
conditionally relevant adjuncts which can be used to express a manner, reason, 
goal, time or purpose of action. In that way a sentence with a proper name 
NN is doing something could be understood as NN is doing something as 
NN (which means as-so-and-so). I argue that the substitution of names can 
fail on modified readings because the different descriptive content of proper 
names modifies the main predicate differently. Here I present a formal 
representation of modified predicates which allows one to model intuitively 
the different truth-conditions of sentences from The Puzzle. 
KEYWORDS: The Superman Puzzle, proper names, substitution failure, 
qualifying prepositional phrases, modified predicates, descriptivism, adjuncts, 
pseudonyms, simple sentences 
1. INTRODUCTION: DOUBLE LIFE 
By the 1970s, Romain Gary, the French novelist, was a literary 
celebrity. A decorated war pilot and diplomat he won the Prix 
Goncourt in 1956, at the beginning of his career as a novelist. But  
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twenty years later, critics and readers were sated with the books of  
a fading literary star. So, while still publishing as Romain Gary, he 
created a new identity, that of a young Algerian student, Émile Ajar, 
who had fled to Brazil to escape jail and from where he was sending 
his manuscripts. In 1975, the second of Ajars novels became a literary 
sensation and the Académie Goncourt awarded the prize to the author 
whilst knowing nothing about his real identity. In such a way Gary 
became the only person to win the Prix Goncourt twice. Knowing that 
Gary and Ajar is one and the same person, consider: 
(1) Romain Gary won the Prix Goncourt in 1956. 
(1) Émile Ajar won the Prix Goncourt in 1956. 
(2) Émile Ajar, not Romain Gary, won the Prix Goncourt in 1975. 
(2) Romain Gary, not Émile Ajar, won the Prix Goncourt in 1975. 
Sentences (1) and (2) are true but our intuitions about the truth-
value of (1) and (2) are mixed. On the one hand, Gary and Ajar is one 
and the same person and it is true about this person that he won the 
prize in 1956 and in 1975, but on the other hand, while being Romain 
Gary, he didnt win the prize as Romain Gary in 1975, and didnt win 
it as Ajar in 1956.  
Here is another story. The greatest boxer Muhammad Ali lost five 
fights in his boxer-career but he never lost a fight before he changed his 
name. Consider: 
(3) Cassius Clay was never beaten, whereas Muhammad Ali lost 
five times. 
(4) Muhammad Ali lost more fights than Cassius Clay. 
Sentence (3) and (4) could be true (actually that is how people 
complain on Alis fanpages) but again you may have mixed intuitions 
about their truth-value. Sentences (1)(4) exemplify three main cases of 
The Superman Puzzle  the phenomenon of the substitution failure in 
simple sentences which occurs when a change from one co-referential 
name to another affects the truth-value of a sentence in an extensional 
context. By Case 1 (C1) I will understand a situation in which one and 
the same person (or object) with names NN and MM 
simultaneously does something as NN and does something else as MM 
(or does something as NN but does not act as MM (while still being 
MM)). C1 is represented by sentence   the same person, Romain 
Gary, won the Prix as Émile Ajar, not as Romain Gary, while still being 
Romain Gary. By Case 2 (C2) I will understand a situation in which the 
same person (or object) does something as NN at one time and does 
something as MM at another time (sentence ). Finally, all sentences 
with comparative quantifiers (e. g. more than in sentence ) will 
constitute Case 3 (C3).  
I have presented three cases of The Puzzle using genuine proper 
names, not pseudonyms, but most examples you can find in the 
philosophical literature concern the names of superheroes:  
 
C1: 
While talking on the phone to Superman, Lois looked through the 
window at Clark Kent (Moore 1999, p. 102). 
Clark Kent went into phone booth and Superman came out (Saul 
1997, p. 102). 
 
C2: 
I never made it to Leningrad, but I visited St Petersburg last week 
(Saul 1997, p. 103). 
 
C3: 
Superman was more successful with women than Clark Kent 
(Saul 1997, p. 103). 
Superman leaps tall buildings more frequently than Clark Kent 
(Moore 1999, p. 92 n. 1). 
Hammurabi saw Hesperus more often than he saw Phosphorus 
(Crimmins 1998, p. 19). 
 
Note that The Puzzle appears only for those who know that names 
NN and MM refer to one and the same person (Moore (1999) 
proposed calling such people enlightened). So if you are enlightened 
it seems that you have to choose between two ways of explaining why 
intuitively the substitution of co-referential proper names fails in 
sentences (1)(4) and why sentences as (2), (3) and (4) seems true. You 
can say that the truth-values of (1) and (1) differ because these 
sentences express different propositions (that is exactly why (2), (3) and 
(4) are true  they express a proposition other than an analytically false 
one). Or, on the contrary, you can say that sentences (1) and (1) 
semantically expresses one and the same proposition but pragmatically 
convey different ones, and that is why people have mixed intuitions 
about the truth-conditions of sentences (1)(4). I will call a view of the 
former type semantic and of the latter type p r a g m a t i c . 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section I shall explain 
why The Puzzle puzzles. In section 3 I briefly explain my proposal of 
semantics for qualifying prepositional as-phrases (as so-and-so) 
which I will analyze in a similar way as adverbs are treated  as 
predicate modifiers. In section 4 I lay the groundwork for my own 
proposal. I will develop a hypothesis that the descriptive content of 
proper names could behave as truth-conditionally relevant adjuncts 
and be an additional contribution of proper names to the truth-
conditions. Finally, in the Appendix, I will present a formal semantics 
for predicate modifiers and a model for one of The Puzzle sentences. 
2. WHY THE PUZZLE PUZZLES 
Let me start from the s e m a n t i c  t y p e  of view. The proponents 
of such a view assume that sentences from The Puzzle express different 
propositions so the core of the puzzle lies in giving a semantic 
explanation as to why sentences which seem simple, differing in co-
referring proper names only, nevertheless express different 
propositions. Let us have a closer look at such a sentence. Consider: 
Superman is successful with women but Clark Kent is not. It seems 
at first glance that if you accept the Leibniz Law of the Indiscernibility 
of Identicals you face a dilemma: either you have to give up names co-
referentiality, or have to accept the view that such sentences are always 
false. Link  who was trying to solve the similar puzzle of substitution 
failure between co-referential group terms and between coextensive 
plural terms  expresses the former possibility in the following way 
(1983, p. 304): So if we have, for instance, two expressions a and b that 
refer to entities occupying the same place at the same time but have 
different sets of predicates applying to them, then the entities referred 
to are simply not the same. If you give up the co-referentiality of 
names then the problem of substitutivity failure becomes trivial. In the 
case of The Superman Puzzle, David Pitt (2001), Bjørn Jespersen (2006) 
and (a contextual version of it) Joseph Moore (1999) hold such a view. 
According to them, sentences from The Puzzle express different 
propositions because proper names are not genuinely co-refering (they 
refer to different fusions of time-slices (Pitt) or to different aspects 
(Moore) of the same individual, or they refer to different individual 
concepts (Jespersen)). It is little wonder that giving up co-referentiality 
leads to problems with identity statements. Identity statements 
expressed by sentences of the form NN is MM c o m e  o u t  f a l s e  
(or at least are false in some contexts). Besides this unintuitive 
consequence, this type of a solution blocks the substitution of proper 
names in situations in which it is intuitively allowed (Predelli 2004,  
p. 110; Saul 2000, p. 256; Saul 2007, pp. 3334).  
So perhaps it would be better to keep the co-referentiality of names 
and, in order to explain how sentences from The Puzzle could express 
different propositions, to give up the claim that sentences are simple 
(to give up the principle called by Predelli (2004, p. 108) Syntactic 
Innocence). Such a line of explanation was taken by Graeme Forbes 
(1997, 1999, 2006) who noticed that sentences from The Puzzle, as for 
example, Lex fears Superman, could be paraphrased with the 
pronoun such, Lex fears Superman a s  s u c h  (2006, pp. 15758). 
According to Forbes, in the case of substitution failure, simple 
sentences should be understood as containing the covert prepositional 
phrase as such in which the pronoun such should be treated as a 
case of logophora (a special case of anaphora in which an expression 
serving as antecedent is taken itself as a referent of an anaphoric 
pronoun). In a nutshell, the Forbesean idea was to treat dossiers of 
information (or, more precisely, a capacity to activate a certain dossier) 
as a representation of Fregean modes of presentation (2006, p. 158).  
A speaker could create different dossiers in which he stores different 
information about one and the same object. A proper name serves as  
a label for somebodys dossier; so if you substitute one proper name in 
a sentence for a different but co-referential one, you will change the 
reference of a covert pronoun while the referent of a name will remain 
the same. The new label will activate a different dossier so all you have 
to do to get a difference in truth-conditions is to connect expressions 
and dossiers (modes of presentation) with a special function which 
induces opacity and makes a mode of presentation which is connected 
with a name as part of the truth conditions (2006, pp. 15859).  
Mark Crimmins (1993, p. 273) raised an objection to the general 
version of this view (which covers belief ascriptions) and proposed the 
consideration of a story in which Lois encounters Superman in both 
guises but does not know either of his names. We can report for 
example: Lois believes that Clark is in the building, but doesnt 
believe that Superman is in the building. Intuitively, this sentence is 
true, but the possibility of using Loiss unlabelled dossiers is ruled out 
on Forbes account. 
So perhaps a better idea would be to preserve both co-referentiality 
and syntactic simplicity and shift the criteria of evaluation. Stefano 
Predelli (2004) followed this line and noticed that sentences from The 
Puzzle could be uttered in different contexts with different focuses of 
conversation. It could be so that, due to a special focus of a conversation 
in a context, some contextually salient circumstances should be taken 
into account in order to decide if a proposition expressed by a sentence 
in this context is true or not. The use of a name in a context triggers 
some features of the names bearer which are of importance due to the 
focus of a conversation. Taking these features into account, the 
conversation participants decide if a referent of a proper name belongs 
to the extension of a predicate or not. Note that we are talking about 
the features of one and the same referent of both names and, once 
these features are taken into account, nothing prevents the 
substitution of proper names (if all they contribute to truth-
conditions is their referent). Saul (2007, pp. 5556) objected that it is 
not clear what these circumstances are and how to use them in order 
to solve examples of C3. 
Let us leave the semantic camp and see what the proponents of the 
p r a g m a t i c  v i e w  would propose. According to such views, 
sentences from The Puzzle semantically express one and the same 
proposition but pragmatically convey different ones. Alex Barber 
(2000) tried to explain The Puzzle using Gricean notion of implicature. 
A speaker uttering Superman is more successful with women than 
Clark Kent semantically expresses an analytically false proposition 
but his conversational partner assumes that the speaker is preserving 
the Cooperative Principle and is talking a s  i f  he is one who is 
unaware that Superman is Clark Kent. Those who are unaware 
(unenlightened speakers) would, under foreseeable epistemic 
conditions (for example taking into account attributes of appearing), 
utter what the speaker uttered (2000, pp. 303304).  
But what about truth-conditions? As we know, an implicature is not 
a part of the truth-conditions of a proposition literary expressed. 
Consider: 
(5) If Clark Kent didnt ever pick up a woman and Superman did, 
then Clark Kent is more successful with women then Superman. 
We could have mixed intuitions about Superman is more 
successful with women than Clark Kent but sentence  strikes us as 
false (or even inconsistent). But it should be true on Barbers account 
(because it is an implication from false to false). So it seems that the 
pragmatic view leads to a dilemma: either the information 
pragmatically conveyed is a part of what is said and affects the truth-
conditions or the truth-conditions of what is said differs radically from 
our intuitions. Note that if you accept the former claim (as Recanati 
(2012, p. 203 n. 5) did) you will owe the same explanation as the 
proponents of a semantic view. 
So the main problem for a real pragmatist is to provide semantically 
adequate truth-conditions for sentences from The Puzzle. It has to be 
said that a lot of people have an intuition similar to Barbers in that 
enlightened speakers uttering such sentences somehow pretend. 
Thomas Zimmermann (2005) elaborated this intuition and tried to fix 
the problem with the right truth-conditions. In a nutshell, what makes 
speakers unenlightened is the lack of knowledge that NN and MM is 
one and the same person. So when enlightened speakers utter 
sentences from The Puzzle they pretend and talk as if they were 
unenlightened: If I believed that NN is not MM then I would say that 
NN is Q. Zimmermann calls such utterances counterfactual speech 
acts (2005, pp. 7778). According to him, in our conversational 
practice we naively assume that no two names of our language have 
the same bearer (Principle of Uniqueness (UP), 2005, p. 70). This 
assumption is rather a naive belief, nevertheless, according to 
Zimmermann, it is a cornerstone of our conversational behavior and 
constitutes one of the conversational principles. So when one 
enlightened speaker talks to another and uses two co-referential 
names, he violates one of the conversational principles and this in turn 
triggers an implicature that the speaker does so in order to convey 
another proposition. But what about truth-conditions? Let us recall 
Freges criterion of thought difference (1892/1984, p. 162): Anybody 
who did not know that the evening star is the morning star might hold 
the one thought to be true, the other false. According to this criterion, 
two sentences with co-referential names express two different thoughts 
(which are the same in terms of truth-value) and for somebody one of 
the thoughts could be true and the other could be false with respect to 
the things he believes. Zimmermann uses this criterion: sentences from 
The Puzzle have the same o b j e c t i v e  truth-value but could differ in 
truth-value with respect to somebodys doxastic perspective (differ in 
a s u b j e c t i v e  truth-value). So when an enlightened speaker violates 
UP he switches his language to the subjective language of 
unenlightened speakers who believe wrongly that NN and MM 
refer to different people. Switching languages is expressed formally 
as changing the context of uttering to another which is exactly the same 
except for the language it is spoken in. So we get intuitively right truth-
conditions (sentence (5) appears false) i n  a  s u b j e c t i v e  
l a n g u a g e  of those who believes that names NN and MM refer 
to different people. This last claim makes this solution similar to the 
proposal of all of those from the semantic camp who assume that 
proper names do not genuinely co-refer and that is why they have  
a similar problem with the falsity of identity statements (2005, pp. 9495).  
I hope I have convinced you that The Puzzle puzzles and now  
I intend to present my solution to it. 
3. MODIFIED PREDICATES 
I will remain in the semantic camp and develop an idea similar to 
the Forbesean. I take The Superman Puzzle to be a case of a broader 
phenomenon of substitution failure of co-referential nominal phrases: 
apart from proper names, this phenomenon concerns co-referential 
group terms (The Committee Puzzle), plural terms, definite descriptions 
and natural kind terms (Link 1983; Landman 1989; Szabó 2003). In 
(Poller 2016) I raised a hypothesis that the role of a descriptive content 
associated with proper names (and other terms) could not only be 
reference determining but this content could also serve as a truth-
conditionally relevant adjunct used to express a manner, reason, goal, 
time or purpose of action. The idea in a nutshell is to treat identifying 
descriptions the so-and-so associated by speakers with a proper 
name as qualifying prepositional phrases as so-and-so. In such  
a way, a sentence containing a proper name NN is doing something 
could be understood as NN is doing something as NN (which means 
as so-and-so). I present the semantics of prepositional as-phrases 
briefly (elaborated version of it you can find in (Poller 2016)) and then 
turn to a way of how it could be used to solve The Puzzle.  
Consider the following sentence: 
(6) The papal nuncio supported an anarchist protest. 
Although nothing prevents one understanding (6) as saying the 
papal nuncio supported an anarchist protest as a private person you 
understand (6) rather as (6): 
(6) The papal nuncio supported an anarchist protest as the papal 
nuncio. 
We could paraphrase (6) as (6): 
(6) The papal nuncio as such supported an anarchist protest. 
I agree with Forbes who noticed that all the sentences which form 
The Puzzle could be paraphrased with the pronoun such (cf. Lex 
fears Superman as such, 2006, p. 158) and espouse the view that 
as-phrase invokes a mode of presentation connected with an 
expression. But contrary to Forbes, who treats such as a case of 
logophora, I think of such as an adjectivally anaphoric pronoun 
standing for a property (after (Carlson 1980), (Landman & Morzycki 
2003), (Landman 2006), (Siegel 1994), (Wood 2002)) and see no reason 
to think that the preposition as induces opacity. I propose analyzing 
prepositional as-phrases in a similar way to that in which adverbs 
are analyzed  as predicate modifiers1.  
                                                        
1  An anonymous referee noted that a placing syntactically as-phrase as  
a predicate modifier (John a s  a  m i n e r  s u p p o r t e d  a protest) seems 
unintuitive, and the as-phrase should be analyzed as a name-modifier instead 
(J o h n  a s  a  m i n e r  supported a protest). Such a line of analysis was used by 
Landman (1989). Szabó (2003, p. 391) raised convincing syntactical objections 
against such a view: modified names (John-as-a-miner) do not coordinate with 
other names, cannot form possessives and cannot be given as an answer for who-
In my analysis of as-phrases, I followed Romain Clark (1970) who 
proposed a semantics for adverbs and prepositional phrases which was 
an alternative to events semantics proposed by Donald Davidson 
(1967/2001). The core of Clarks proposal is the idea that predicates 
could be built recursively out of -place predicate constants by adding 
modifiers which have  places in total. So for example take stroll. It 
is a 1-place predicate. Take the adverb slowly. If you add this adverb 
to stroll (getting slowly stroll) you would not increase the number 
of argument places. So slowly is 0-place modifier (as are many other 
adverbs). The extension of slowly stroll is a subset of the extension 
of stroll (Clark 1970, p. 325) and that is why you can infer from 
Sebastian slowly strolled that Sebastian strolled but not the other 
way around. This type of adverbial entailment failure is known as Non-
Entailment (Davidson 1967/2001; Katz 2008) and we will see that it is a 
key property in solving the failure of the substitution puzzle. Now take 
at and through. Each of them are 1-place modifiers and if you add 
them to stroll (getting stroll-through-at) you will increase the 
number of argument-places and will get a new 3-place predicate out of 
a 1-place initial one. You can infer from Sebastian strolled through the 
streets of Bologna at 2 a.m. (Davidson 1967/2001, p. 167) that 
Sebastian strolled because the new 3-place predicate is connected 
with the initial 1-place predicate stroll by a requirement that an 
object occupying the first place of the triple (Sebastian) should belong 
to the extension of stroll (this type of entailment is called Drop). 
I propose treating prepositional as-phrases as 0-place predicate 
modifiers. Unlike other prepositional phrases, as-phrases do not 
increase the number of argument-places, and, unlike adverbs, do not 
modify a predicate with all its argument places a s  a  w h o l e , they 
modify it on one argument-place only. Note that if you know that d is 
doing  and  and is , you cant infer that either  or  is done by d 
as  (by Non-Entailment). This entailment failure shows that the 
extension of a modified predicate  although dependent on 
the extensions of  and  (by Drop), is not fully determined by them. 
                                                        
questions. Taking these arguments into account I analyze as-phrases as predicate 
modifiers. I answered syntactic and semantic objections raised by Szabó against 
such a view in (Poller 2016). 
Let me briefly go through some syntactic and semantic definitions. 
By a modifier we will understand all predicates abstracted2 from an 
atomic formula or a conjunction of atomic formulas with one free 
variable, e.g. , . An n-place predicate constant 
 could be modified by a modifier  on its ith argument place; we 
write this new modified predicate as  . For example greet is  
a two-place predicate,  is a formula with one free variable in which 
 means a host of a party. ,  are predicates built 
via modification from the predicate constant ; we read them as 
a host of a party x greets y (modification on the 1st argument place) 
and as x greets y as a host of a party (modification on the 2nd 
argument place). We will use a simplifying convention and in the case 
that a modifier is a predicate abstracted from an atomic formula, , 
we will simply write   instead of   and in the case that  is 
1-place predicate we will write   instead of  . 
I limit predicates abstracts which could be modified to predicates 
abstracted from atomic formulas and their negations,  
and . A modifier  modifies a predicate abstract on 
ith argument place of  (written   in general notation).  
I preserve an intuition that a modified predicate abstract 
 and a predicate abstracted from a formula with a 
modified predicate  are one and the same 
predicate (so you can take a modifier in and out of a predicate abstract, 
see (Poller 2016) for proof). Formulas with all kinds of predicates 
(predicate constants, predicate abstracts, modified predicates and 
modified predicate abstracts) are built in a standard way.  
Let  and  be 1-place predicates. I defined an interpretation of 
modified predicate  ( ) as a subset of a conjunction of 
interpretations  and : . So, for example,  
could be the papal nuncio  and could support an anarchist 
protest , but could support an anarchist protest not as the 
papal nuncio ( ). (For the general definition of an 
interpretation of a modified predicate see Def. III.  in Appendix).  
A modified predicate is still a predicate, it is interpreted as a subset of 
a predicate being modified, that is, a set of n-tuples such that every ith 
                                                        
2  In using predicates abstracted from a formula, predicate abstracts I 
followed Fitting and Mendelsohn (1998, pp. 194, 196 Definition 9.4.2). 
element in n-tuple fulfils the descriptive content . Modifiers are closed 
under the conjunction: .  
My analysis covers uses of as-phrases as adjuncts of manner  
(I will use the rest of the olive oil as a base for salad dressing), time 
(Ann was fat as a child), reason (As a firefighter, John was asked to 
help in the rescue action) and purpose (They hired him as  
a launching engineer). But it doesnt cover uses of as-phrases as 
adjuncts of comparison (His mother still treats him a s  a  c h i l d ) 
when we compare two things A and B under respect C and do not say 
that A i s  B (contrary to requirements of our semantic definition). 
4. NAMES AND PSEUDONYMS AS MODIFIERS 
Let us return to sentence , Émile Ajar won the Prix Goncourt in 
1956. The reason why we may have mixed intuitions about its truth 
conditions lies in the ambiguity between modified and unmodified 
readings. You can say, Its true that Ajar won the Prix Goncourt in 
1956, but Ajar won the Prix not as such but as Romain Gary. The 
possibility of replacing a proper name with the adjectivally anaphoric 
pronoun such supports the claim that a proper name in an as-
phrase (didnt win a s  É m i l e  A j a r ) is understood as standing for 
a property, so the predicate win is modified not by a proper name but 
by the descriptive content of a proper name. The idea standing behind 
the modification of predicates by names is simple: the modifying content 
of a proper name  is a predicate  abstracted from the formula  of 
a definite description  connected with a proper name . 
Despite being a descriptivist (in my opinion, speakers do associate 
definite descriptions with proper names) I do not think that the 
phenomenon of predicate modification by a descriptive content of 
names should be understood as evidence supporting descriptivism. 
Possibly you can accept this phenomenon without accepting any 
version of descriptivism (however, you will need an additional 
explanation of what kind of descriptive content should be semantically 
connected with names and why). Because of my claim that the 
modifying content of a proper name is a property expressed by  
a description connected with the name, I need to briefly explain my 
proposal of the formal representation of proper names in accordance 
with the descriptive theory of reference (descriptions are used to fix a 
names reference, a full version of this proposal can be found in (Poller 
2014)). In a nutshell I represent proper names formally as a special kind 
of terms (which I call name-terms) which designate via sets of 
definite descriptions. By definite description I understand a special 
kind of iota-terms of the form , where   is a notational variant 
of  operator (true at ) taken after (Rini & Cresswell 2012). Time 
operator  fixes a time of evaluation, so a definite description  
designates with respect to any time  the object designated by iota-term 
 with respect to time  (I call definite descriptions  a c t u a l  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  ). I am trying to catch the idea that a definite 
description designates contingently with respect to possible worlds but 
if it designates in a world, it designates in that world one and the same 
object with respect to any time. That is why a iota-term representing  
a definite description should have a fixed time-parameter (e.g. the 
p r e s e n t  Pope, the Pope i n  1 9 6 7 ).  
My account of modified predicates is not general so the most 
complicated modifier could be a predicate abstracted out of  
a conjunction of atomic formulas with one free variable. That is why  
I will use only s o m e  of the iota-terms , such that  is  
a conjunction of atomic formulas. To avoid circularity (to be sure that 
definite descriptions  used to determine a name-terms reference 
contain no name-terms) I need two languages,  and  ( ). Let 
me start from language  which contains only variables and iota-terms 
as terms. The idea is to let name-terms designate through equivalence 
classes of descriptions designating one and the same object. But 
descriptions designate different objects with respect to different worlds 
so we need to define an equivalence relation not on a set of descriptions 
but on a set of pairs containing a description and a world in which the 
description designates. In order to be able to formally distinguish two 
co-referential names I have added a set of predicates ( , , , ) to 
 which we will read as called , called  etc. where  ,   are 
string of sounds or inscriptions.3 I will use symbol   for iota-
terms  with only one variable  which occurs free in . Letting the 
                                                        
3  Arguments supporting such a view of verbs of naming can be found in 
(Geurts 1997), see also (Matushansky 2008). 
formula  in a description  have a form of a conjunction of  
a distinguished predicate and a 1-place undistinguished predicate  
( , e.g. a planet called [f s f r s]) we can define an 
equivalence relation in such a way that two description-world pairs 
belong to the same class when their descriptions designate the same 
object and contain the same predicate . So for example, take two 
descriptions, the planet called [f s f r s], the planet called [h s p r
s] (we name them ,  respectively). Both descriptions ,  
designate in our world , but pairs ,  will belong to 
different equivalence classes because  contains predicate called [f s
f r s] while  contain a different predicate called [h s p r s]. This 
idea is represented schematically in Graph 1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
Graph 1 
 
 
I wont go into formal details (full versions of theses definitions can 
be found in Appendix) and instead will just explain the key steps. In 
order to define an interpretation of a name-term  I need two functions 
 one which connects  with an equivalence class (function ) and 
the other which takes an equivalence class and gives the object 
designated by every description in the class (function ). I have 
presented this idea in Graph 2 below: 
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In effect, name-terms designate rigidly (see (Poller 2014) for proof) 
and are not synonymous with descriptions (this is exactly what a 
descriptive theory of reference postulates). As I have said, the idea of 
the predicate modification by a descriptive content of a proper name is 
simple: if we say that NN is doing something as NN, we mean that 
there is a (unspecified) way of describing NN such that NN is doing 
something in that way. Let  stand for an atomic formula or a negation 
of an atomic formula. We will take any name-term  to be a modifier, 
and write   for a modified predicate abstract and   
for a formula (a name-term and a predicate abstract modified by  
a name-term could form a formula iff the name-term occupying an 
argument place of this predicate is the same as the modifying name-
term). The idea of predicate modification by a descriptive content of  
a proper name is represented formally as a requirement that a formula 
 is satisfied in a model with respect to a world  and a time 
 iff there is a description  in the set of descriptions for the term 
 and the world  such that the model satisfies  with 
respect to . Note that we drop a fixing-time operator , so our 
modifying descriptive content (  obtained from a definite 
description ) is sensitive to scope differences of temporal and 
modal operators. Take a formula with a name and a predicate. On an 
unmodified reading, , all that the descriptive content of a 
proper name does is just pick up the reference, that is why a change of 
a proper name to a different but co-referential one is without 
significance because all you need for truth-conditions is just the names 
referent and a property named by a predicate. But on a modified 
reading, , we want the descriptive content of a name to be 
taken into account as a circumstance of action (expressing a manner, 
goal, reason or time), so we make it a part of a predicate. When we say 
that NN is doing something as NN we understand by it that NN is 
  
 
 
 
doing something in a descriptive way  actual with respect to a time 
(and a world) of evaluation. So, for example, by saying , Cassius 
Clay was never beaten, whereas Muhammad Ali lost five fights, we 
convey that the greatest boxer was never beaten at a period of time 
when he was a boxer called Cassius Clay and he lost five fights after 
changing his name to Muhammad Ali.  
It has to be said that on this account a descriptive content of co-
referring genuine proper names differs only in naming predicates 
(called , called ). Intuitively the difference in descriptive content 
between Superman and Clark Kent is deeper. I take expressions 
such as Superman or Batman to be pseudonyms and think that the 
semantics of proper names differs from the semantics of pseudonyms 
(cf. Katz 2001). Let us have a closer look at pseudonyms. They are 
broadly understood as the names that people assume for a particular 
purpose (Room 2010, p. 3). In American copyright law it is underlined 
that a pseudonym should be fictitious (nicknames and other 
diminutive forms of legal names are not considered as fictitious, cf. 
Copyright Office Fact sheet FL101). Usually people take pseudonyms 
for their activity as artists, writers, political and religious leaders, 
gamers, secret agents and so on. It is a remarkable fact about 
pseudonyms that they can become an adopted new name whenever  
a person becomes mainly or solely known by their pseudonym (Room 
2010, p. 4). I take this feature of pseudonyms  to be assumed for  
a particular purpose  as a key feature that distinguishes pseudonyms 
from genuine names.  
As I explained earlier, I represent genuine proper names as name-
terms which designate via sets of definite descriptions of the form 
. The key difference between the formal 
representation of pseudonyms and names lies in representing 
pseudonyms as terms (called pseudonym-terms) which designate 
via sets of definite descriptions of the form . 
Every description in such a set contains a modified distinguished 
predicate , which we read as named  as  (e.g. called [ben d kt] 
as a pope, called [ k t] as a hockey player), and contains a 1-place 
undistinguished predicate modified by the same predicate . By such 
a formal representation of pseudonyms I am trying to express their key 
feature of being assumed for a particular purpose. So I want the 
descriptive content of a pseudonym to describe an individual as doing 
everything with this particular purpose (e.g. called [ben d kt] a s   
a  p o p e , sends a message to the faithful a s  a  p o p e , publishes 
a work a s  a  p o p e  etc.). The other key feature of pseudonyms, their 
possibility of becoming genuine names (e.g. John Wayne), when  
a person starts to use a pseudonym not only for a particular purpose, 
will not be formally represented.4, 5  
As I said earlier, to avoid circularity I need two languages,  and  
( ). Language  contains only variables and iota-terms as terms 
and language  contains additionally a set of name-terms 
 and a set of pseudonym-terms . 
Pseudonym-terms are interpreted in the same way as name-terms  via 
                                                        
4  However, the possibility of pseudonyms to become genuine names could be 
formally represented. In order to represent it we could add a special operator 
only ( ) operating on a modifier only as ). For example, at the beginning of 
his actor career Marion Morrison was named [d nw n] only as a film actor but 
from a time  he was named [d nw n] not only as an actor. So if we let 
pseudonym-terms designate via sets of definite descriptions of the form 
 (containing a distinguished predicate modified by the only 
as  modifier, ), then from the time  it would be false that Morrison is named 
[d nw n] only as a film actor. A pseudonym-term (formal representation of John 
Wayne) is obstinately rigid and designates Morrison with respect to any time and 
world but from the time  (in our world ) it has no descriptive content which 
could modify a predicate (since  it is false that he is named [d nw n] only as an 
actor which in turn means that there is no description of the form 
, where , connected with the pseudonym-term). Letting name-terms 
designate via descriptions containing modified predicates we will get a name-term 
formally representing the name John Wayne (not the pseudonym John Wayne) 
which would designate via descriptions with fixing-time operators , where 
. This means that at any time later than  Morrison would not do anything under 
the pseudonym but under the name John Wayne. 
5  I need to note that things are not so simple from the formal side. Imagine 
that Smith decided to be named Rocky as a boxer. Intuitively, besides the 
pseudonym Rocky, he did not take a new name Rocky. Formally we will have 
descriptions designating Smith with named [ k ] as a boxer-predicate and with 
unmodified named [ k ]-predicate. Due to this besides a pseudonym-term 
designating Smith we will have a name-term designating him via descriptions 
containing named [ k ]-predicate. In effect we will have name-terms which do 
not model any proper names from a natural language. In order to prevent such 
consequences we need to throw away intuitively rubbish descriptions 
containing the unmodified predicate named [ k ] and designating Smith (see 
Def. VI. ,  and ). I have elaborated upon the problem of rubbish 
descriptions in my PhD thesis (2014). 
equivalence classes of description-world pairs, , 
which means that pseudonym-terms are obstinately rigid. A formula 
with a pseudonym-term is satisfied in a standard way when the 
referent of a pseudonym belongs to the extension of a predicate. 
However, a pseudonym-term has a specific feature which 
distinguishes it from a name-term: in all possible worlds such that a set 
of descriptions determining the pseudonyms reference is non-empty  
a pseudonym-terms referent would have a property   besides  
a property called . Let me illustrate this specific feature by the 
following example. Consider four possible worlds , , , . In 
world  Joseph Ratzinger became pope and as pope was called 
[ben d kt s ksti:n ]. On becoming pope, he visited Germany first. In 
world  he, Benedict XVI, visited France first. In world  Ratzinger 
failed to get into theological school and became a cigarette smuggler 
who always left sixteen cigarettes in his abandoned caches and as a 
result was known in the criminal underworld as Benedict 16. In world 
 the police were unable to catch him but in world  Ratzinger, 
called [ben d kt s ksti:n ] as a smuggler, was arrested. Formally we will 
have two pseudonym-terms representing Benedict XVI-a pope and 
Benedict-16-a smuggler pseudonyms. In all worlds such that Ratzinger 
is called [ben d kt s ksti:n ] as a smuggler he is a smuggler. Contrary to 
pseudonyms, proper names have no specific property besides called 
 which is preserved in possible worlds in which a set of descriptions 
determining the names reference is non-empty and that is why it is 
easier to construct The Puzzle using pseudonyms than proper names. 
I defined predicate modification by a descriptive content of a proper 
name as a requirement that a formula  is satisfied in a model 
with respect to a world  and a time  iff there is a description  
in the set of descriptions for the term  and the world  such that the 
model satisfies  with respect to . It seems that there 
is no reason for an intended definition of modification by a descriptive 
content of a pseudonym  to be different. But, as we 
remember, the account of modified predicates presented here is not 
general and the most complicated modifier is a predicate abstracted 
from a conjunction of formulas containing unmodified atomic 
predicates. Every definite description connected with a pseudonym-
term contains predicates modified by some predicate , 
, and predicate abstracted from it cant be used 
as a modifier. That is why a definition of predicate modification by  
a descriptive content of a pseudonym differs from a definition of  
a modification by a descriptive content of a proper name: a formula 
 is satisfied in a model with respect to a world  and a time 
 iff there is a description  in the set of 
descriptions for the term  and the world  such that the model 
satisfies  with respect to . Having no 
modification of a predicate by an already modified predicate (having 
no iteration) we cannot, for example, express that Superman is entering 
the phone booth dressed a s  a  s u p e r h e r o  (predicate entering is 
modified by the adjunct dressed which in turn is modified by the 
as-phrase). Instead we express the fact that Superman is entering the 
phone booth a s  a  s u p e r h e r o  (predicate entering is modified by 
the as-phrase). 
In the Appendix I have presented the formal semantics for modified 
predicates and have modeled sentences with names and pseudonyms 
representing C1. I have not presented a model for C2 sentences 
(sentences such as I have never made it to Leningrad, but I visited St 
Petersburg last week) because they are easy to explain: intuitively 
such sentences are true because it is not the case that Petersburg is 
officially called [len ngræd] anymore, so you cant visit it as such. Nor 
have I presented a model for C3 sentences with comparative 
quantifiers such as . Intuitively in  we compare the cardinality of 
sets of fights that the greatest boxer won as Muhammad Ali and won 
as Cassius Clay. The cardinality of these sets differs and that is why  
is true. 
CONCLUSION 
I treat the phenomenon of the substitution failure of co-referential 
proper names in simple sentences as a special case of the broader 
phenomenon of a lack of substitutivity between two co-referential 
nominal phrases. I argue that the descriptive content associated with 
proper names, besides determining the proper names reference, 
functions as truth-conditionally relevant adjuncts which could be used 
to express a manner, reason, goal, time or purpose of action. In that 
way a sentence with a proper name NN is doing something which 
could be understood as NN is doing something as NN (which means 
a s - s o - a n d - s o ). I propose to analyze qualifying as-phrases as 
predicate modifiers and present a formal representation of modified 
predicates. According to my view, sentences from The Superman Puzzle 
are ambiguous between modified and unmodified readings and this 
assumption explains why speakers have mixed intuitions about such 
examples. Whereas nothing prevents the substitution of co-referential 
proper names on unmodified readings, the substitution of names can 
fail on modified readings because the different descriptive content of 
proper names modifies the main predicate differently, so in effect 
sentences can have different truth conditions. I treat names such as 
Superman and Batman as pseudonyms and argue that the 
semantics for pseudonyms differs in some respect to the semantics for 
genuine proper names. Intuitively, the key difference between names 
and pseudonyms lies in a pseudonyms feature of being assumed for  
a particular purpose and I reflect this feature in a formal representation 
of pseudonyms. 
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APPENDIX: THE FORMAL REPRESENTATION OF NAMES, 
PSEUDONYMS AND MODIFIED PREDICATES 
The languages  and  are based on first-order predicate logic with 
identity and descriptions (I followed Fitting & Mendelsohn 1998). I will 
skip all standard definitions and present the definitions that are 
specific for a formal representation of modified predicates, names and 
pseudonyms.  
 
Let me start from the language  which contains only two sorts of 
terms, variables and iota-terms. 
 
Definition I: The alphabet of  
A first-order language  contains the following symbols: sentential 
connectives , , , , ; quantifiers , ; an infinite set of individual 
variables , , , ; an infinite set of predicate constants , , , , 
with a positive integer (an arity) assigned to each of them; identity sign 
; the definite descriptions operator ; the abstraction operator ; 
temporal operators of past  and future ; an infinite set of temporal 
operators  (true at ), where ; modal operators , ; an infinite 
set of distinguished predicate constants , , , ; a set of numerical 
symbols for natural numbers; the left parenthesis , the right 
parenthesis . 
 
Definition II: The syntax of  
Predicate constants and, defined below, predicate abstracts, modified 
atomic predicates and modified predicate abstracts are predicates of . An 
atomic predicate of  is any predicate constant. The notions of a formula,  
a term, a predicate and a free variable occurrence are defined as follows: 
 
The notions of a variable ( ), a predicate constant ( ), an atomic 
formula ( ),  ( ), , , ,  ( ), , , 
 ( ), ,  ( ), ,  ( ),  ( ),  ( ) are 
defined in a standard way; 
  if  is a 1-place predicate constant and  is a variable, then 
 is a modifier. Modifiers contain no free variable 
occurrences; 
  if ,  are modifiers, then  is a modifier; 
  if  is a n-place predicate constant and  is a modifier 
then  is n-place atomic predicate modified by  on 
th argument place of  (where ); 
  if  is a predicate abstract and  is a 
modifier, then  is a predicate abstract 
modified by  on th argument place of  (where ); 
the free variable occurrences in  are those 
of ; 
  if  is a predicate abstract and  is a 
modifier, then  is a predicate abstract 
modified by  on th argument place of  (where 
); the free variable occurrences in 
 are those of ; 
 
  if  is a n-place predicate constant,  is n-place modified 
predicate and  is an n-element sequence of variables, 
then  is a formula in which all variable 
occurrences in the n-element sequence are free;  
  if  is a predicate abstract and  is a term, then  
is a formula; the free occurrences of variables in  are 
those of  together with those of ; 
  if  is a modified predicate abstract and  is a term, 
then  is a formula; the free occurrences of 
variables in  are those of  together with 
those of ; 
  nothing else is a formula, a term, a predicate, a modifier and  
a free occurrence of a variable. 
 
Notational convention: 
 if  is a 1-place predicate constant and  is a modifier, then instead 
of   we will write  ; 
 if  is a n-place predicate constant and  is a modifier, then 
instead of   we will write  . 
 
Definition III: The semantics of  
A varying domain first-order model  for  is a structure 
, such that: 
  is a domain function mapping pairs of possible world and time 
 to non-empty sets. The domain of the model is the set 
. We write  for the domain of the model 
 and  for a value of the function  for an argument ; 
  is a set of natural numbers and  (earlier then) is a linear order 
defined on elements of  (a set  is thought as a flow of time); 
  is a non-empty set of possible worlds; 
  is a function which assigns an extension to each pair of an atomic 
predicate or modified atomic predicate of  and a pair , where 
, in the following way: 
 if  is a n-place predicate constant, then ;6 
  ;  
let  be a variable assignment (a mapping that assigns to each free variable 
 some member  of the model domain ) and let  be a function 
which assigns an extension to each pair of an atomic predicate, a modified 
predicate or a term of  and a pair , where : 
 if  a variable, then  for any ; 
  for any ; 
the notion of interpretation of terms other than variables and 
interpretation of modified predicates and satisfaction of formulas in  
are defined as follows: 
  if  is a n-place predicate constant and  are variables, 
then  iff ; the 
notions of satisfaction of  ( ),  ( ),  
( ),  ( ),  ( ) are defined in a standard way; 
                                                        
6  This definition is taken after Fitting & Mendelsohn (1998, p. 103 Definition 
4.7.3). I accept the authors reasoning behind it. 
  if  is a n-place predicate constant,  is a 1-place predicate 
constant and  is a variable, then  
; 
  if ,  are n-place atomic predicates modified by 
,  on th argument place and ,  are variables, 
then ; 
 if  is a n-place predicate constant,  is a variable, and , 
 are modifiers, then  
; 
 if  is an atomic formula and  is 
a modified predicate abstract, then  
; 
 if ~  is a negation of an atomic formula and 
 is a modified predicate abstract, then  
; 
 if  is a n-place predicate constant,  is a modifier and 
 is a n-place modified predicate, then 
 iff ; 
the notions of satisfaction  ( ),  ( ) are defined in a 
standard way;  
 if  is a formula, then  iff ; the notions 
of satisfaction  ( ),  ( ),  ( ),  ( ) are 
defined in a standard way; 
  if  for exactly one , then ; if it 
is not the case that  for exactly one , then  
fails to designate at  in  with  respect to ; the notion of 
satisfaction of  ( ) is defined in a standard way; 
  if a term  designates at  in  with respect to  and 
 is a modified  predicate abstract, then  
 iff ;  
if a term  fails to designate at  in  with respect to , 
then . 
I will use symbol   for a special case of  terms with only 
one variable  which occurs free in . There are no free variable 
occurrences in  and due to this if  is defined then 
 for any assignments  and . That is why 
instead of   we will write   which should be 
understood as   where  is any assignment. 
Now I will expand language  to  by adding name-term and 
pseudonym-terms. I will skip all syntactical and semantic definitions 
of  duplicating the definitions of  and will write below only new 
ones. 
 
Definition IV: The alphabet of  
A first-order language  contains all symbols of  with the addition 
of an infinite set of name-terms  and an infinite set 
of pseudonym-terms . 
 
Definition V: The syntax of  
  the same as  of ; 
  a name-term or a pseudonym-term is a term with no free 
variable occurrences; 
 are the same as  of ; 
   is a modifier, where  is a name-term or a pseudonym-term; 
  are the same as  of ; 
  if  is a predicate abstract and  is a name-term 
or a pseudonym-term, then  is a predicate 
abstract modified by  on th argument place of  (where  
); the free variable occurrences in  
are those of ; 
  if  is a predicate abstract and  is a name-
term or a pseudonym-term, then  is  
a predicate abstract modified by  on th argument place of 
  (where ); the free variable occurrences in 
 are those of ; 
  are the same as  of ; 
  if  is a modified predicate abstract and  is a name-
term or a pseudonym-term, then  is a formula iff 
; the free variable occurrences in  are those of 
; 
  the same as  of . 
 
Definition VI: The semantics of  
Let  be a model of . A varying domain first-order 
model  for  is a structure , where .  
Using already defined properties of  (Definition III) we define 
the following sets, relations and functions. 
: set  
Set  is a set of iota-terms  of .  iff 1) there is  
a world  such that for every time   designates at  
in ; 2)  or  or  
, where  is a distinguished predicate 
and ,  are undistinguished predicates. (I will use symbols  , 
 for members of ) 
 
: set  
.  iff for any time   is defined. 
 
: set  
.  iff there is a predicate  and a time  such 
that  and  contains  or , where  is  
a distinguished predicate and  is an undistinguished predicate. 
 
: set  
.  iff  or  
, where  is a distinguished predicate 
and ,  are undistinguished predicates. 
 
Let = . 
 
 
  
: relation  
.  iff for any time   and 
there is either the same predicate  or the same predicate  in 
, . 
 
Let  be a partition of set  by equivalence relation  and 
 be an equivalence class from .  
 
: function  
. For any , , where for 
any time  for any . 
 
Let  be any well-order relation on a set  and let  be 
well-ordered set.  
 
: function  
. Function  for an argument gives an 
equivalence class  in the following way: 
 for   gives the least element of ; 
 for every next element of  (with respect to an index)  gives next 
element of ; 
 in case there are no next element in  
then for a next element of   gives the least element of 
; 
 
 for   gives the least element of ; 
 for every next element of  (with respect to an index)  gives next 
element of ; 
 in case there are no next element in  then for a 
next element of   gives the least element of . 
 
: relation  
.  iff ,  belong to the same equivalence 
class  and . 
 
  
: function  
. For any ,  
 if there is such an equivalence class, otherwise 
 is undefined. For any ,  
 if there is such an equivalence class, otherwise  is 
undefined. 
 
Semantic rules  of language  are the same as rules  
of language  (except of talking about  instead of ); 
  if  is a name-term and , then  
; if , then  fails to designate 
in  (at any ); 
  if  is a pseudonym-term and , then  
; if , then  fails to designate in 
 (at any ); 
  if a term  designates at  in  with respect to , then 
 iff  , where ; if 
a term  fails to designate at  in  with respect to , 
then ; 
 if a term  designates at  in  with respect to   
and  is a modified  predicate abstract, then 
 iff ; if a 
term  fails to designate at  in  with respect to , then 
; 
 if  is a name-term and  is a predicate abstract 
modified by , then  iff there is  
a description , such that  
; 
 if  is a pseudonym-term and  is a predicate abstract 
modified by , then  iff there is  
a description , such that  is  
a modifier of a predicate  from the description  
and . 
In (Poller 2016) I have proven that you can take a modifier in and 
out of a predicate abstracted from an atomic formula or a negation of 
atomic formula,  
  
iff , 
  
iff , 
which is very useful in proofs (I will refer to it as Theorem). Now I 
will model a sentence from The Puzzle. 
 
Let  be a model of , , 
,  for . Let us use 
symbols   (reporter),   (superhero),   (talks on the phone 
with),   (look through the window at) instead  ,  ,  , 
  of . Let use symbol   for called , symbol   
for called  and symbol   for called . Let  be 
defined in following way: 
 
 
      
 
    
 
   
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
         
 
 
       
       
 
 
      
 
 
For a predicate  and any time . For predicates 
other than those mentioned above and , where  is any time, 
function  gives . 
 
Set  (Def. VI. ): 
    
    
    
 
       
       
 
Set  (Def. VI. )                 Set  (Def. VI. )   Set  (Def. VI. ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Set  (Def. VI. )            (Def. VI. )          Function  (Def. VI. ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
Function  (Def. VI. ): ,   Function  (Def. VI. ) 
       where  is  or  
Let us see what the value of the following sentences is: 
(a) While talking on the phone to Superman (as Superman), Lois looked 
through the window at Clark Kent (as Clark Kent); 
(b) While talking on the phone to Clark Kent (as Clark Kent), Lois 
looked through the window at Superman (as Superman). 
 
(a) ;  
(b) . 
 
(a) 
  
iff (Def. VI. ) 
 and  
 iff (Def. VI. ) 
, where  and  
, where  iff (Def. VI. ) 
there is a description , such that  is a modifier of  
a predicate  from the description  and  
, where  and  
there is a description , 
such that , where  iff (Theorem) 
there is a description , such that  is a modifier of  
a predicate  from the description  and 
, where  and  
there is a description ,  
such that , where  iff (Def. VI. ) 
there is a description , such that  is a modifier of  
a predicate  from the description  and 
, where ,   and  
there is a description , such that 
, where ,  iff (Def. VI. ) 
there is a description , such that  is a modifier of  
a predicate  from the description  and , 
where ,  and  
there is a description , such that , 
where , . 
 
It is so that , , .  
Let  be , .  
It is so that , ,  
so (Def. VI. ) , . Modifier  is a modifier of 
a predicate  from any description . It is so that 
. This means that formula  i s  s a t i s f i e d . 
 
 
 iff  
(Def. VI. ) 
 and  
 iff (Def. VI. ) 
, where  and  
, where  iff (Def. VI. ) 
there is a description , such that 
, where  and there is a description 
, such that  is a modifier of a predicate  
from the description  and ,  
where  iff (Theorem) there is a description  
, such that ,  
where  and there is a description , such that 
 is a modifier of a predicate  from the description  and 
, where  iff (Def. VI. ) there 
is a description , such that  
, where ,  and there is a 
description , such that  is a modifier of a predicate 
 from the description  and  , where 
,  iff (Def. VI. ) 
there is a description , such that , 
where ,  and there is a description  
, such that  is a modifier of a predicate  
from the description  and , where , 
. 
It is so that , , . 
Every description from the set  contains the predicate . It is so that 
, which means that . This in turn means that 
for any description   (Def. VI. ). The 
first part of formulas conjunction is not satisfied, so  is n o t  s a t i s f i e d . 
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